

Northeast Florida Regional Council
Military Installation Readiness Review



Opportunities Assessment Report and Cost Benefit Analysis

MARCH 2026



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Acronyms and Abbreviations

APZ	accident potential zone
DoD	Department of Defense
EOC	Emergency Operations Center
FDOT	Florida Department of Transportation
FPL	Florida Power & Light
FPSC	Florida Public Service Commission
FWC	Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission
HB	House Bill
IGSA	intergovernmental support agreement
JTC	Joint Training Center
LOI	letter of intent
MAA	mutual aid agreement
MCSF	Marine Corps Support Facility
MIRR	Military Installation Readiness Review
MOA	memorandum of agreement
MOU	memorandum of understanding
MSA	mutual support agreement
NAS	Naval Air Station
NCCOS	National Centers for Coastal Ocean Science
NEFRC	Northeast Florida Regional Council
NFLT	North Florida Land Trust
NFWF	National Fish and Wildlife Foundation
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NOLF	Naval Outlying Landing Field
NS	Naval Station
O&M	operations and maintenance



REPI	Readiness and Environmental Protection Integration
SB	Senate Bill
SLR	sea level rise
SR	state road
SWOT	strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats
TPO	Transportation Planning Organization
UGA IRIS	University of Georgia Institute for Resilience Infrastructure Systems
USACE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
VA	vulnerability assessment



Executive Summary

Purpose

This memorandum outlines the findings of Task 5: Mutual Support Among Regional Installations and Local Governments for the Northeast Florida Military Installation Readiness Review. The task explores informal partnerships and mutual support agreements across the region, evaluating how these arrangements align with installation vulnerabilities identified in Task 4. The analysis identifies opportunities for the region to better coordinate around shared vulnerabilities and carry out resilience actions identified in later phases of the project.

Key Findings

The Northeast Florida region has a strong foundation of mutual support. Numerous fire protection, emergency services, and law enforcement agreements are in place, and, amongst those interviewed, are considered effective and essential to operations. Institutional structures, notably the North Florida Transportation Planning Organization, further support collaboration between military installations and state and local partners.

Through the lens of identified installation vulnerabilities, however, coordination gaps exist. Transportation coordination is supported through established planning frameworks but does not prioritize installation access and resilience needs. Utility agreements address ongoing operations, but do not address redundancy or long-term resilience concerns. Shoreline maintenance and restoration partnerships are active but largely project-driven rather than programmatic. Wildfire management coordination exists in practice but is not broadly or formally organized. Finally, housing availability and affordability are shared concerns, but no active regional coordination addresses installation-related housing needs.

Recommendations

Opportunities exist to strengthen mutual support by formalizing and expanding coordination in these areas. At the regional level, this includes strengthening transportation coordination, expanding utility coordination to incorporate resilience and redundancy, formalizing shoreline and wildfire management coordination partnerships, and reestablishing a regional housing coordination effort. At the installation level, this includes formalizing existing informal relationships, establishing partnerships where gaps exist, and ensuring continuity of agreements that support mission-critical functions.

Conclusion

The region can build from its strong base of effective partnerships and agreements. The primary opportunity is to formalize and expand these relationships so they are durable, aligned with identified vulnerabilities, and capable of facilitating resilience- and mission-supportive actions.



1 Introduction

This memorandum is the final deliverable of “Task 5: Mutual Support Among Regional Installations and Local Governments” for the Northeast Florida Military Installation Readiness Review (MIRR).¹ This task evaluates the current landscape of mutual support among military installations and surrounding jurisdictions in the Northeast Florida region and assesses how those arrangements align with the vulnerabilities identified through the MIRR analysis. The focus is on understanding where formal and informal coordination exists and whether these arrangements are positioned to address identified risks. The analysis serves as a readiness assessment of the region’s capacity to coordinate around shared vulnerabilities and support implementation of resilience actions developed in later phases of the project.

1.1 Approach and Analytical Process

The Northeast Florida Regional Council (NEFRC), supported by Jacobs and Throwe Environmental (Throwe), conducted research and stakeholder engagement to assess mutual support and partnerships in the MIRR study area and identify opportunities for enhanced partnerships. The approach involved an evaluation of the current mutual support landscape across military installations in the region (Naval Air Station [NAS] Jacksonville, Naval Station [NS] Mayport, Camp Blanding Joint Training Center [JTC], and Marine Corps Support Facility [MCSF] Blount Island) and their relationships with state, county, and local government entities. Throwe engaged directly with installation representatives, local government officials, and regional planning staff, as well as with other state and regional stakeholders through the MIRR Technical Advisory Committee to understand how mutual support agreements (MSAs) function in practice, where gaps might exist, and what opportunities could strengthen mission assuredness and community resilience.

The analytical process combined document review, stakeholder interviews, and comparative analysis. Throwe first cataloged known MSAs and informal agreements through desktop research and by distributing a stakeholder survey to members of the MIRR Technical Advisory Committee (refer to Appendix A). Next, they conducted a series of interviews with key stakeholders from each installation, Clay County, and the cities of Jacksonville, Jacksonville Beach, and Atlantic Beach.² These conversations allowed Throwe to explore how well current agreements align with mission priorities, identify informal partnerships and relationships not yet documented, and explore emerging needs related to vulnerabilities identified through the Vulnerability Assessment in Task 4 of the MIRR. Following this assessment, an installation-level assessment was conducted along with a regional strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analysis that examined where mutual support functions well and where opportunities for additional benefits exist.

¹ The original scope of Task 5 included an analysis of Continuity of Operations Plans. Given concerns for making these public, Throwe was directed to exclude these from the analysis on 1/23/26. The original scope also envisioned incorporating outcomes from Task 6; however, Task 6 results were unavailable for this Technical Memo.

² Interviews were critical to assessment and the development of recommendations at the installation and regional level. A list of cited interviewees are included in Section 5.



1.2 Assessment Structure

Mutual support was analyzed through two lenses: 1) an Installation-Level Assessment, and 2) a Regional Assessment.

1.2.1 Installation-Level Assessment

Using a combination of vulnerability study results, interviews, provided MSA information, and secondary research, each installation was evaluated independently to assess how its specific vulnerabilities intersect with its mutual support arrangements.

To evaluate coverage and capacity to address identified vulnerabilities, the following criteria were used for each installation:

- *Existence*: Does formal or informal coordination exist for a given vulnerability or identified need?
- *Effectiveness*: Does the existing MSA or informal coordination function in practice as intended?
- *Future Conditions*: Is the MSA or informal coordination likely to withstand leadership/staff turnover, administrative changes, or shifting governance conditions? Is the arrangement likely to be sufficient for addressing projected vulnerabilities?
- *Efficiency*: Would a change in structure, formalization, or expansion of MSAs or other existing coordination produce sufficient resilience benefits to justify the costs?³

1.2.2 Regional Assessment

After the by-installation review, patterns and themes were synthesized across the region, and a SWOT analysis was conducted to address shared vulnerabilities across installations and jurisdictions.

³ A formal economic benefit–cost analysis was not conducted. Instead, recommendations are informed by a qualitative assessment of the likely resilience benefits of increased coordination relative to anticipated administrative, legal, and operational costs of formalization.



2 Mutual Support Frameworks and Regional Context

Before conducting the analysis and making recommendations, Throwe researched types of MSAs and current federal, state, and local policy to inform our assessment of conditions and areas of opportunity for the Northeast Florida region.

2.1 State, County, and Local Governance

2.1.1 Home Rule

Local governments can only perform those functions granted to them by the state in which they reside and within their established boundaries. They are direct service providers and perform functions such as trash collection and disposal, land use planning and permitting, infrastructure building and maintenance, recreational programming, local law enforcement, and first responder emergency services (NLC 2016).

Florida is largely a “Home Rule” state (State of Florida 2025). Home rule is a delegation of power from the state to its sub-units of governments (that is, counties, municipalities, and special districts). That power is limited and often subject to judicial interpretation but in broad terms, home rule creates local autonomy and limits the degree of state interference in local affairs. However, Florida is an exception to the exclusive selection of home rule, in that it employs home rule in most instances but reserves taxing authority for the state.

2.1.2 Special Districts

Municipalities usually require more targeted and intensive service provision than is necessary throughout more rural areas, particularly in the public safety fields such as law enforcement and emergency fire and medical response. Special districts are established by the State of Florida to address specific functions that cross local county and municipality geographic boundaries such as water management districts and regional planning councils. Because of the relatively small footprint of established local governments, their restricted authority, and the limited personnel and financial resources available to them, local governments often partner with other governmental entities (for example, neighboring jurisdictions and/or special units of government) to accomplish mutual goals, take advantage of economies of scale, or share capacity and capabilities. These partnerships often include MSAs that detail each partner’s roles and responsibilities.

2.2 Overview of Mutual Support Agreements

Various types of MSAs exist, each with varying levels of formality. These agreement vehicles exist to encourage—and in some cases, formally establish—partner coordination and collaboration, as noted in Table 2-1.



Table 2-1. Types of Mutual Support Agreements

Type of Agreement	Description	Relative Level of Formality (1 star - informal; 4 stars – most formal)
Letter of Intent (LOI)	An informal, non-binding document indicating intent to explore collaboration, often used for initiating new projects or one-time efforts. LOIs signal goodwill and a willingness to discuss cooperation, usually requiring fewer signatures and no financial transactions as they are typically non-binding.	★ ☆ ☆ ☆
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)	A formal but non-binding agreement outlining general areas of understanding between parties. Often used to state common goals and describe program operations without involving financial transactions. Functions as a “formalized handshake” between parties.	★★ ☆ ☆
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)	A binding agreement specifying conditions for collaboration, often involving the transfer of funds for services. MOAs define terms for reimbursement, payment processes, and legal terms but do not obligate funds directly. They establish frameworks for future service agreements.	★★★ ☆
Mutual Aid Agreement (MAA)	A formal agreement between entities, such as local governments, to share resources during emergencies. Focuses on reciprocal aid, often for crisis management, and establishes the legal basis for resource sharing. Authorized by jurisdictions for mutual assistance at local, state, or international levels.	★★★★
Intergovernmental Support Agreement (IGSA)	A formal agreement that establishes a partnership between military services and local/state governments for various support services. Authorized by Title 10 Section 2679 of the United States Code (10 U.S.C. § 2679), IGSAs aim to achieve cost savings, operational efficiencies, and enhanced mission assurance. Services range from waste removal to joint emergency responses (GAO 2018).	★★★★

2.2.1 MAAs and IGSAs

Among the various types of MSAs described in Table 2-1, MAAs and IGSAs warrant further discussion. Unlike more flexible or informal coordination mechanisms, these two agreement types are clearly defined and legally grounded tools that formalize intergovernmental relationships. While other agreements and working relationships may reflect evolving collaboration, MAAs and IGSAs establish structured frameworks for shared support and services. In the context of resilience and mission assuredness, they provide insight into how emergency response



and ongoing operational support are formally integrated between installations and local governments.

MAAs are formal, reciprocal agreements that authorize participating jurisdictions to provide assistance to one another during emergencies or declared incidents. In Florida, MAAs are widely used among counties, municipalities, and special districts to share fire protection, emergency medical services, law enforcement, and other public safety resources. Within the MIRR study area, MAAs serve as the legal foundation for coordinated emergency response between installations and their neighboring communities. These agreements clarify roles, responsibilities, and liability protections, and they establish predictable protocols for resource deployment during crisis situations.

Their specificity and formality reflect, in part, the demands of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and its operational framework, the Incident Command System, the standardized approach to emergency management used nationwide and for which incident personnel at all levels are trained. Under this system, incident response begins locally, with the Incident Commander drawing on pre-established MAAs to access additional resources before escalating to the state or federal level. As such, MAAs play a central role in supporting shock response capacity and ensuring that installations are integrated into the broader regional emergency management system.

IGSAs are authorized under 10 U.S.C. § 2679 and allow military installations to enter into agreements with state or local governments for installation-support services. Unlike MAAs, IGSAs are not primarily emergency-response tools; rather, they are procurement mechanisms designed to promote cost savings and operational efficiencies. Services provided under IGSAs can include (but are not limited to) utilities, waste management, public works, and other municipal functions. In the context of resilience, IGSAs are significant because they formalize the operational interdependence between installations and local service providers. Where an installation relies on a local government entity for essential services, the reliability and resilience of those services directly affect mission assurance.

Beyond their functional value, IGSAs also help build relationships between military installations and their surrounding communities by promoting working relationships and mutual trust that, over time, can expand into broader collaboration. This aligns with the Office of Local Defense Community Cooperation's mission by fostering cooperation between defense communities and military installations, where the boundary between installation and locality becomes less a barrier and more a seam in a shared regional system. While many existing IGSAs focus on routine service delivery, they represent an institutional framework through which resilience considerations—such as redundancy, infrastructure hardening, and continuity planning—could be incorporated over time.

2.3 Existing Regional Agreements

There is a strong network of formal MSAs and informal relationships in Northeast Florida that support military installations in the region. These agreements span a range of focal areas including, but not limited to, fire protection, emergency services, land use, law enforcement,




security, and utility operations. They also involve all four study area installations, Clay and Duval counties, municipalities within both counties, and other state and federal stakeholders.

Figure 2-1 depicts the network of existing regional agreements and partnerships identified in Northeast Florida. Solid lines indicate a formal MSA between the two parties, while dotted lines indicate an informal working relationship.

As shown, the current landscape of partnerships is complex, spanning both formal and informal relationships between installations, other U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) entities, state agencies, private organizations, and county and local governments. While this network does not currently engage on all key issues identified in the Vulnerability Assessment, research shows that there is a broad coalition of organizations that are already working together on issues of regional importance. This network is the foundation of mutual support in the region and can serve as a starting point for expanding mutual support to address issues of interest.



Figure 2-1. Mutual Support and Partnerships in Northeast Florida



3 Gaps and Opportunities Analysis

Building off the analysis of existing MSAs and partnerships in the study area, the next step of Task 5 involved identifying any gaps in the current mutual support network in the region and exploring opportunities to enhance collaboration to better support mission assuredness and regional resilience. This began with the Vulnerability Assessment (VA) conducted by the NEFRC and Jacobs through Task 4 of the MIRR, overlaying the focal areas of current MSAs. With the VA as the backdrop, MSAs were examined to determine whether they address, or are likely to address, the vulnerabilities projected to impact installation readiness and regional resilience. Based on this assessment, Throwe identified potential gaps and opportunities to further cultivate partnerships and collaboration around issues of primary concern.

3.1 Current Mutual Support Efforts in the Region

MSAs covering emergency services are the most prevalent category of formal agreements across the study area. These agreements formalize NIMS in the region and provide fire protection support, emergency management support, post-disaster response support, and in certain cases, Emergency Operations Center support. These agreements are present and formalized between all four study area installations and their neighboring municipal and/or county governments. Most installations also have agreements in place with local law enforcement agencies allowing jurisdiction on installations, providing installation security in certain instances. Interview participants consistently praised these agreements as highly effective and crucial to installation operations.

Beyond emergency services and law enforcement, the region benefits from several strategic land use and encroachment protection initiatives. For example, a 2022 Encroachment Protection Agreement between the U.S. Department of Defense, the City of Jacksonville, and North Florida Land Trust (NFLT) has protected development rights on approximately 1,700 acres in accident potential zones (APZs) around NAS Jacksonville and NS Mayport. Another example: Camp Blanding maintains a nonvoting seat on a Clay County planning advisory panel, which reviews developments within a 3-mile buffer zone of the installation. While this arrangement is non-voting, stakeholders voiced its effectiveness in giving the installation an active voice on encroachment issues.

While these three focal areas capture the bulk of existing MSAs and partnerships in the region, numerous agreements exist that address other issues including resilience and environmental protection, utility operation and maintenance, transportation, and economic development. Appendix A provides a complete list of existing regional agreements and partnerships identified during this task.

Table 3-1 displays the MSAs that were captured through research and stakeholder outreach. MSAs included in Table 3-1 capture formal agreements related to regional resilience that are active within the MIRR study area. Agreements are totaled by focal area, and by installation.



Table 3-1. Existing Mutual Support Agreements

Focal Area	Total ^a	NAS Jax	NS Mayport	Camp Blanding	Blount Island
Fire/Emergency Services	12	3	2	3	3
Law Enforcement/Security	8	1	3	--	5
Land Use & Encroachment	4	2	2	1	--
Resilience & Environmental	4	--	--	--	—
Utility O&M	2	1	1	--	--
Economic Development/ Education	1	--	--	--	--
Transportation	1	--	--	--	--
Total	32	7	8	4	9

^a Does not represent a direct sum of the installation-level counts. Agreements involving multiple installations are counted in each installation column but only once in the total; additionally, some agreements have no installation as a direct party and are reflected only in the total.

O&M = operations and maintenance

3.2 Installation-Level Assessment

The following section presents an installation-specific assessment of mutual support across the four MIRR study area installations: NAS Jacksonville, NS Mayport, Camp Blanding JTC, and MCSF Blount Island. Each installation is evaluated independently to assess how its existing mutual support arrangements intersect with the primary vulnerabilities identified through the Task 4 VA. Figure 3-1 provides an overview of the vulnerabilities examined during Task 4. For each installation vulnerability, the analysis examines whether mutual support infrastructure exists, discusses the effectiveness of current arrangements, analyzes how future conditions may impact this effectiveness, and addresses whether strengthening mutual support in these target areas could efficiently boost resilience.

This installation-by-installation approach is intended to ensure that the specific operational context, geographic conditions, and partnership landscape of each installation are accounted for before drawing broader regional conclusions.


Lack of attainable housing was acknowledged in the VA, but not analyzed. Potential solutions and recommendations on housing will be reviewed and discussed in Task 7, the adaptation planning phase of the MIRR.



Figure 3-1. Vulnerabilities Examined through Task 4 of the MIRR

Threats and Hazards – MIRR Vulnerability Assessment

Northeast Florida Regional Council Military Installation Resilience Review | Threats and hazards analyzed or reviewed in the Vulnerability Assessment



3.2.1 NS Mayport

3.2.1.1 Primary Vulnerabilities

The primary vulnerabilities facing NS Mayport as identified by the VA are captured in four general categories:

- *Transportation Infrastructure:* State Road (SR) A1A and other access roads are vulnerable to sea level rise (SLR), erosion, and storm surge.
- *Utility Infrastructure:* A single JEA substation serves the entire base with no redundancy and is vulnerable to storm surge and rainfall flooding.



- *Shoreline Erosion:* The installation perimeter and adjacent conservation lands are vulnerable to SLR and erosion.
- *Housing:* On-base housing is at 90% occupancy; some personnel commute for over an hour each way because of lack of affordable housing near the installation.

3.2.1.2 Evaluation of Mutual Support Coverage

Transportation Infrastructure

Existence: The North Florida Transportation Planning Organization (TPO) provides a formal regional coordination structure for transportation planning and programming and includes Jacksonville/Duval County and Clay County representation, Navy representation in an ex officio capacity, and Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) in an advisory role.

Effectiveness: Much of the burden of addressing vulnerabilities to these roads lies outside of the jurisdiction of the installations. Many of the roadways identified as risks to NS Mayport's mission in the VA are FDOT-owned, while several regional roadways identified as risks have various local and regional ownership. TPO planning has formally incorporated SLR and storm surge considerations into its transportation resiliency planning and has identified SR A1A and installation access corridors as vulnerable sites, while also identifying relevant resilience strategies. Consequently, as a means for planning, the TPO is a highly effective forum for identifying and planning for the installation's resilience concerns.

Future Conditions: With military, state, and local government representation formalized in the federally mandated transportation planning area, coordination is institutionally durable. As the TPO expressly plans for future conditions, including through a resilience lens, there are no concerns for the ability to address installation transportation priorities associated with the VA moving forward.⁴

Efficiency: With formal Mayport representation on the TPO, the benefits of creating an additional installation-specific coordination mechanism are uncertain and likely limited. Absent evidence the TPO is insufficient for the installation's transportation priorities, any effort at additional formalization would, at best, likely duplicate existing capacity.

Utility Infrastructure

Existence: A formal IGSA exists with JEA for utility operations and maintenance. However, this agreement addresses routine service delivery only, not resilience or redundancy. No mutual support or service provision to cover redundancy or related needs was identified. Installations benefit from priority restoration status as high-priority accounts, which supports continuity of operations after an outage, though this is distinct from redundancy or resilience investment.

⁴ A supportive document is the 2050 Path Forward long-range transportation plan https://northfloridatpo.com/uploads/2050_L RTP_Final_Report-2.pdf (2024). The LRTP relies on federal mandates and state and TPO-generated resilience planning as bases for its development.



Effectiveness: The existing IGSA is not a mechanism for addressing or mitigating the vulnerability of the installation to impacts from storm surge or rainfall flooding. It may be that the procurement agreement with JEA has ancillary benefits allowing for reduced transaction costs if a redundancy solution is pursued. JEA is actively working on resilience system-wide, though this appears to focus on continuity of operations rather than redundancy per se, and it is unclear whether those efforts extend to the specific single-point-of-failure vulnerabilities identified at the installation.

Future Conditions: As the vulnerability of the existing substation to storm surge and rainfall flooding intensifies with time, so too will the need for action. Whether the current absence of coordination around redundancy is sufficient to address future needs may depend on the nature of how this vulnerability is addressed. If the solution is a discrete capital project, project-specific arrangements may be sufficient. However, if broader system changes are required, a more formal resilience-oriented framework may be warranted.

Efficiency: Expanding on the existing JEA IGSA to incorporate resilience and redundancy planning into the installation-JEA relationship would be an efficient path. JEA is already an established partner; the institutional framework exists and could be modified or built on. However, because resilience improvements require capital investment rather than operational coordination, an IGSA may not be the appropriate vehicle—capital commitments of that nature would likely require a separate agreement. An expanded IGSA could nonetheless serve as a useful bridge, explicitly referencing the need for a capital investment strategy and designating it as governed by a separate agreement.

Shoreline Erosion

Existence: Shoreline resilience efforts in the NS Mayport area have advanced meaningfully in recent years. The City of Jacksonville is currently implementing three living shoreline projects in partnership with the University of Georgia Institute for Resilience Infrastructure Systems (UGA IRIS) and the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation (NFWF), including hydrodynamic modeling of salt marshes near Mayport and a project in preliminary design at Helen Cooper Park, a Navy-leased property adjacent to the installation. The Navy and UGA IRIS have a resilience-focused IGSA in place, and UGA recently chaired the inaugural meeting of a multi-stakeholder Steering Committee convened to bring coordination and synergy to these projects. The Steering Committee includes the Navy, the City of Jacksonville, the St. Johns River Water Management District, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). Duval County has also previously undertaken shoreline restoration and protection projects in partnership with the USACE.

Effectiveness: The emerging City/UGA/NFWF partnership represents a more substantive foundation than prior project-specific efforts, and the Navy's existing IGSA with UGA IRIS and its seat at the new Steering Committee suggest a growing institutional awareness of the installation's shoreline interests. This partnership provides an opportunity for installation-specific shoreline needs to be consistently elevated during regional planning efforts.

Future Conditions: SLR, storm surge, and ongoing coastal erosion are projected to intensify shoreline vulnerabilities at NS Mayport over time. As coastal threats worsen, the presence of a



coordination mechanism that explicitly addresses installation shoreline vulnerabilities in regional planning becomes increasingly important.

Efficiency: The UGA IRIS and Navy IGSA provides an efficient entry point for regional collaboration on coastal resilience. Rather than creating a new coordination mechanism, NS Mayport could leverage the existing Steering Committee framework to ensure the installation's priorities are embedded in ongoing and future shoreline planning. This represents a particularly efficient path given the groundwork already laid.⁵

Housing

Existence: No formal or informal MSA or coordinated regional effort addressing housing availability or affordability for NS Mayport personnel was identified. Affordable housing needs were raised in interviews with both the installation and local government representatives, but no partnership structure exists to coordinate adaptation actions.

Effectiveness: In the absence of coordinated mutual support between the installation and surrounding communities, housing availability and affordability challenges affecting NS Mayport personnel—namely high occupancy of on-base housing and extended commute times for those residing off-base—indicate the current approach is not adequately meeting housing needs.

Future Conditions: Housing affordability near NS Mayport is worsening because of a variety of factors, notably regional population growth and an increase in short-term rentals. Without active coordination between the installation and nearby communities, its vulnerability to impacts from affordable housing shortages and increasing commute times is likely to increase.

Efficiency: Jacksonville has existing housing affordability infrastructure via the Jacksonville Housing Authority, and NEFRC previously had an affordable housing committee. During an interview, a representative from Atlantic Beach noted that a housing-based partnership with the Navy may be worth exploring. Engaging these partnerships may be an efficient means for approaching installation housing needs. As affordability and related commute burdens directly affect mission readiness, the potential benefit of structured mutual support may be proportionate to the effort required.

Table 3-2 summarizes the installation-level assessment findings for NS Mayport. Opportunities and recommendations that build off these findings are presented in Section 4.

⁵ Shoreline protection emerged as a key recommendation in the East Central Florida MIRR as well, where an MSA between Patrick SFB and the City of Cape Canaveral was recommended to support collaborative shoreline management. This suggests that installation-community agreements addressing coastal resilience are a recognized and transferable model across Florida.



Table 3-2. NS Mayport Findings Summary

Vulnerability	Existence	Effectiveness	Future Conditions	Efficiency
Transportation Infrastructure	There is formal Navy representation on North Florida TPO; informal FDOT coordination occurs on specific projects.	TPO is a highly effective forum for identifying and planning for installation resilience concerns.	TPO structure is institutionally durable; resilience lens is embedded in ongoing planning with no near-term durability concerns.	The existing structure is efficient. Additional formalization would likely duplicate existing capacity.
Utility Infrastructure	A formal IGSA exists with JEA for utility O&M. The agreement addresses routine service delivery only, not resilience or redundancy.	IGSA does not address storm surge or flooding vulnerability; it is unclear whether JEA resilience efforts cover installation-specific gaps.	As substation vulnerability intensifies, a formal resilience-oriented framework may be warranted beyond the current O&M scope.	Existing IGSA is an efficient foundation for expansion; capital investment would likely require a separate, complementary agreement.
Shoreline Erosion	Navy-UGA resilience IGSA is in place; Jacksonville/UGA/NFWF are working on living shoreline projects; a multi-stakeholder Steering Committee was recently convened.	Emerging partnership is more substantive than prior project-specific efforts; Navy has a seat on the Steering Committee.	Shoreline vulnerabilities are projected to intensify.	Steering Committee and existing IGSA infrastructure are already in place and can be leveraged to address shoreline vulnerabilities.
Housing	There is no formal or informal MSA addressing housing affordability or availability for NS Mayport personnel.	High on-base housing occupancy and extended commute times indicate current conditions are not meeting personnel needs.	Regional population growth and increase in short-term rentals are worsening affordability; readiness impacts are likely to increase.	Jacksonville Housing Authority and prior NEFRC affordable housing committee provide an existing, efficient entry point to regional housing collaboration.



3.2.2 NAS Jacksonville

3.2.2.1 Primary Vulnerabilities

- *Transportation Infrastructure:* State and county roads are vulnerable to rainfall flooding, SLR, congestion, and limited redundancy. The three entry gates for NAS JAX are all along Roosevelt Boulevard, which experiences significant congestion.
- *Utility Infrastructure:* A single JEA substation serves the entire base with no redundancy. The wastewater system also lacks redundancy and faces future regulatory requirements from Florida Senate Bill 64, which will limit surface water discharges of treated wastewater (Florida Statutes 2021).
- *Encroachment:* Naval Outlying Landing Field (NOLF) Whitehouse faces encroachment risk from surrounding growth pressures.
- *Hospitals:* Regional hospitals identified as secondary assets supporting NAS JAX's mission are vulnerable to flooding and SLR. Both the hospital and NOLF Whitehouse face wildfire risk.

3.2.2.2 Evaluation of Mutual Support Coverage

Transportation Infrastructure

Existence: The U.S. Navy has representation on the North Florida TPO, a formal regional coordination body for transportation planning. Additionally, interviewees noted informal collaboration with FDOT for road improvements along U.S. Route 17, as well as for improvements at the I-295 interchange. There has also been communication with the installation and FDOT around SR A1A improvements, including for a state-initiated traffic study.

Effectiveness: Both the TPO and, to a lesser extent, project-specific relationships provide channels through which the station's congestion and other concerns may be incorporated into regional transportation planning and project development.

Future Conditions: Coordination through the TPO is durable, with military, state, and local government representation. The TPO incorporates resilience into its planning, affording NAS Jacksonville a means for advancing transportation priorities moving forward. Informal channels complement this capacity, though are less likely to endure changes in leadership over time.

Efficiency: Given existing U.S. Navy representation on the regional transportation coordination body, NAS JAX appears well-positioned to address its transportation vulnerabilities. Barring evidence of an inability for this to translate into projects addressing issues over time, any effort to create a station-specific coordination effort would likely duplicate existing capacity.

Utility Infrastructure

Existence: A formal IGSA exists with JEA for utility operations and maintenance. However, no agreements or partnerships were identified that address substation redundancy or wastewater concerns.



Effectiveness: The IGSA reportedly functions well for its stated purpose, routine O&M, but it does not address the identified single-substation or wastewater vulnerabilities.

Future Conditions: As a procurement vehicle, the IGSA is durable and does not rely on relationships. However, because it does not currently address redundancy specifically or resilience generally, there may be an opportunity to strengthen the existing relationship to better capture future installation needs. Either an expanded or separate scope could make this a more effective means for addressing current and future needs.

Efficiency: The existing IGSA framework with JEA provides a means for efficiently expanding services to include resilience and redundancy planning. An interviewee flagged that an IGSA with JEA could potentially be used to fund the development of a second substation. Given the potential benefits from eliminating material points of utility infrastructure failure, efforts to leverage the existing IGSA (or its framework for a complementary agreement) may be warranted.

Encroachment

Existence: The 2022 Encroachment Protection Agreement between DoD, the City of Jacksonville, and NFLT has protected approximately 1,700 acres in APZs. This formal agreement has dedicated funding. Additionally, a NAS JAX representative sits on the City of Jacksonville's planning commission.

Effectiveness: This is a multi-year, well-functioning program. The City leads coordination despite minority funding. Development rights have been actively acquired in APZ 1 and 2 areas, directly reducing encroachment risk. Interviewees consistently praised this arrangement.

Future Conditions: The agreement is formal, multi-party, funded (75% from DoD's Readiness and Environmental Protection Integration [REPI] program, 25% state), and institutionalized. Jacksonville is one of only two cities nationwide with a cabinet-level military affairs office, providing strong institutional support. The encroachment protection program is strong, but interviewees flagged state legislation (House Bill 299/Senate Bill 354 "Blue Ribbon" bill) as a potential threat to local land use authority. If state legislation preempts local land use control, the effectiveness of local encroachment agreements may be constrained.

Efficiency: The existing encroachment program is mature and performing well. The marginal benefit of more formal coordination consequently appears limited relative to the effort required. That said, monitoring and response to applicable state legislative changes may be necessary to preserve the agreement's effectiveness.

Hospitals

Existence: The VA identified natural hazard risk to regional hospital facilities in Jacksonville. The review did not identify any formal agreement or structured coordination mechanism explicitly addressing these concerns.

Effectiveness: In the absence of any formal coordination mechanism, regional hospital flooding and wildfire vulnerabilities are not addressed through any structured planning processes.



Future Conditions: As flooding and wildfire risks increase, the absence of a formal coordination mechanism between the station and these hospitals may increase exposure to these vulnerabilities and subsequent service disruption.

Efficiency: Because the regional hospitals are off-base entities not owned or administered by the Navy, establishing a formal coordination mechanism would require material effort. The direct benefits to the station are uncertain, as these are secondary mission-critical assets. The benefits of formal coordination depend on the extent to which these facilities support the mission. If reliance on these hospitals is limited, formalization may yield marginal value relative to the required effort.

Table 3-3 summarizes the installation-level assessment findings for NAS Jacksonville. Opportunities and recommendations that build off these findings are presented in Section 4.

Table 3-3. NAS Jacksonville Findings Summary

Vulnerability	Existence	Effectiveness	Future Conditions	Efficiency
Transportation Infrastructure	Formal Navy representation on the TPO; informal FDOT coordination on SR 17, I-295, and SR A1A improvements.	TPO provides a channel for incorporating installation congestion and transportation concerns into regional planning.	TPO coordination is durable with military, state, and local government representation and resilience integration.	Existing TPO representation positions NAS JAX well moving forward.
Utility Infrastructure	Formal IGSA with JEA for O&M only; no agreements address single-substation redundancy or wastewater vulnerabilities.	IGSA functions well for O&M but does not address substation redundancy or wastewater regulatory concerns.	IGSA is durable but does not address resilience; expanded or separate scope needed for current and future vulnerabilities.	Existing IGSA framework provides a means to efficiently expand services to include resilience and redundancy planning.
Encroachment	The 2022 Encroachment Protection Agreement (DoD, Jacksonville, NFLT) protects approximately 1,700 acres. NAS JAX rep sits on	This is a well-functioning, multi-year program; development rights have been actively acquired in APZ 1 and 2; program is consistently	Program is institutionalized and well-funded; state 'Blue Ribbon' bill (HB 299/SB 354) poses a potential threat to local land use authority.	Program is mature; marginal benefit of further formalization is limited. State legislative monitoring may be necessary.



Table 3-3. NAS Jacksonville Findings Summary

Vulnerability	Existence	Effectiveness	Future Conditions	Efficiency
	City planning commission.	praised by interviewees.		
Hospitals	No formal agreement or coordination mechanism exists addressing flood or wildfire risk to regional hospitals supporting the installation's mission.	In the absence of formal coordination, hospital natural hazard vulnerabilities are not addressed through any structured process.	Flooding and wildfire risks are projected to increase; service disruption exposure increases without a formal coordination mechanism.	Hospitals are off-base, non-Navy entities; formalization requires significant effort with uncertain direct mission benefit.

3.2.3 Camp Blanding JTC

3.2.3.1 Primary Vulnerabilities

- *Transportation Infrastructure:* SR 16 is vulnerable to rainfall flooding. Also, railway infrastructure (CSX-owned) faces rainfall flooding, extreme heat, and age concerns.
- *Utility Infrastructure:* The Florida Power & Light (FPL) substation lacks redundancy and is vulnerable to wildfire. Stormwater systems have a single point of failure. The wastewater system lacks redundancy or interconnection and faces regulatory requirements.
- *Encroachment:* The Clay County side of the installation faces development pressure.
- *Wildfire:* Both conservation lands and electric facilities are vulnerable to wildfire risk.
- *Housing:* Some personnel travel more than 60 miles from the installation, reflecting attainable housing challenges.

3.2.3.2 Evaluation of Mutual Support Coverage

Transportation Infrastructure

Existence: The North Florida TPO convenes FDOT, Clay County, and other regional stakeholders to collaborate on transportation planning. However, while the Navy holds an ex officio position on the TPO board, there is no direct participation from Camp Blanding JTC representatives.

CSX owns the relevant rail infrastructure. The review did not identify any formal or informal coordination channel addressing rail vulnerability.



Effectiveness: In the absence of direct representation at the TPO, which plans for multimodal transportation, including freight, it is uncertain whether the installation's priorities are effectively incorporated into regional transportation priorities.

Future Conditions: Rainfall flooding is projected to intensify, and the installation is already constrained by single-point-of-failure roadway infrastructure. Personnel commuting from a 60+ mile radius—including Jacksonville, Gainesville, and St. Augustine—means transportation disruptions have outsized operational impacts. Addressing rail infrastructure vulnerabilities appears to largely rely on CSX. In the absence of direct representation on the TPO or formal cooperation agreements, it is uncertain whether worsening vulnerabilities will be elevated within regional transportation planning processes over time.⁶

Efficiency: As the TPO has Clay County board members and FDOT as an advisor, improving Camp Blanding's ability to elevate its transportation priorities through that forum may be more efficient than establishing a separate cooperation agreement. If direct representation is infeasible, a targeted agreement with FDOT and Clay County may also address future roadway resilience needs. Rail coordination with CSX would likely require a separate agreement and more complex negotiations. Given CSX infrastructure also supports Blount Island, a shared agreement approach across installations may be more effective and reduce duplication of effort.

Utility Infrastructure

Existence: The review found no agreements for Camp Blanding JTF regarding utility resilience. Power is provided by FPL, and no IGSA or comparable procurement agreement exists. Likewise, the review did not identify any existing stormwater or wastewater coordination agreements.

Effectiveness: Without a formal agreement with FPL, the installation's lack of power redundancy and identified wildfire vulnerability at the substation are not being actively addressed through a cooperation agreement. Similarly, without active collaboration on stormwater and wastewater systems—both of which lack redundancy or interconnection and face regulatory requirements—there is no coordinated means to address these utility vulnerabilities.

Future Conditions: Wildfire risk to the FPL substation is an identified and increase concern. The installation is considering development of its own substations but has not formalized an agreement to support it. Wastewater and stormwater vulnerabilities are presently unaddressed through any formal coordination structure. As these risks intensify over time, the absence of agreements may become more consequential.

Efficiency: Given the installation's power vulnerabilities, formalizing a coordination agreement with FPL may offer clear resilience benefits relative to the effort required. An IGSA or similar procurement agreement could define roles for addressing redundancy and wildfire risk. Stormwater and wastewater vulnerabilities may be addressed through similar coordination with Clay County.

⁶ For example, while Camp Blanding is an identified hub in the TPO's Regional Freight Plan (2024), projects addressing flooding, heat, and aging infrastructure are not evident as priorities. Refer to the *Regional Freight Plan Summary Report* (North Florida TPO 2024).



Encroachment

Existence: On the Clay County side, the installation holds a non-voting seat on the planning advisory panel for developments within the 3-mile buffer, participates in the land conservation committee, and has a new land purchasing agreement in development. The REPI program has supported acquisition of conservation lands through NFLT. The installation also is a party to an agreement establishing the Camp Blanding Wildlife Management Area, in coordination with Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWC). On the Bradford County side, the review did not identify comparable coordination.

Effectiveness: Engagement with Clay County is reportedly improving, and the advisory panel role appears to be effective for elevating Camp Blanding's priorities. The installation's role on the advisory panel is non-voting, and there is no formal requirement to integrate its priorities into county decision-making. On the Bradford County side, where development pressure is lower, the installation does not engage in planning and zoning concerns.

Future Conditions: Clay County engagement functions well with current personnel, but it is not codified and, consequently, it is not structured to weather leadership transitions. Bradford County encroachment risk is presently lower; however, that could change if unmanaged.

Efficiency: Formalizing the existing Clay County partnership may help preserve continuity and protect existing conservation and encroachment investments. Pursuing a formal planning coordination agreement with Bradford County, even a low-commitment MOU, would be relatively low-effort and could address an identified gap before development pressures increase.

Wildfire

Existence: Informal coordination with the Florida Forest Service for wildland fire support exists, though it has not been formalized.

Effectiveness: The informal arrangement has not been tested significantly but appears to function effectively.

Future Conditions: The current arrangement is not codified and relies on informal relationships. Leadership turnover at either organization could put the arrangement at risk.

Vulnerability to wildfire is a growing concern at Camp Blanding, particularly for conservation lands and the FPL substation. As risk increases over time, reliance on an unwritten arrangement may be insufficient for the scale of coordination required.

Efficiency: Formalizing the existing arrangement would likely require less effort than developing a new agreement. Because the Florida Forest Service relationship already exists, the primary work would involve documentation and clarification of roles.

Housing

Existence: The review did not identify any formal or informal coordination between Camp Blanding and surrounding communities regarding housing availability or affordability.



Effectiveness: Extended commute times and limited attainable housing near the installation suggest that current measures are not adequately addressing housing-related impacts to readiness.

Future Conditions: With personnel dispersed across a wide geography and no coordinated housing strategy in place, continued transportation disruptions and housing shortages may worsen over time, affecting readiness.

Efficiency: Camp Blanding’s relatively less urbanized setting may constrain the development of more housing. That said, opportunities may exist to work with Clay County and regional housing initiatives. Interviews identified Middleburg as a potential focus area. Leveraging existing county or regional housing efforts or partners may require moderate effort relative to the potential benefit of reducing commuting challenges.

Table 3-4 summarizes the installation-level assessment findings for NAS Jacksonville. Opportunities and recommendations that build off these findings are presented in Section 4.

Table 3-4. Camp Blanding JTC Findings Summary

Vulnerability	Existence	Effectiveness	Future Conditions	Efficiency
Transportation Infrastructure	There is no direct Camp Blanding representation on TPO; Navy holds ex officio position only. No coordination exists with CSX on rail vulnerabilities.	It is uncertain whether installation priorities are effectively incorporated into regional transportation planning. Rail vulnerabilities appear to rely entirely on CSX without structured coordination.	Rainfall flooding projected to intensify; installation already constrained by single-point-of-failure roadway infrastructure. There is no structured path to ensure worsening vulnerabilities are elevated over time.	Improving TPO engagement via existing Clay County relationships may be more efficient than a separate agreement. A shared approach with Blount Island on CSX coordination could reduce duplication of effort.
Utility Infrastructure	No IGSA or utility resilience agreements exist with FPL or Clay County; no stormwater or wastewater coordination agreements are identified.	Power redundancy gaps, wildfire risk at FPL substation, and stormwater/wastewater vulnerabilities are unaddressed through formal coordination.	Wildfire risk to FPL substation is growing; Wastewater regulatory pressures are increasing.	An IGSA with FPL could address redundancy and wildfire risk; Clay County coordination could cover stormwater and wastewater gaps.



Table 3-4. Camp Blanding JTC Findings Summary

Vulnerability	Existence	Effectiveness	Future Conditions	Efficiency
Encroachment	Installation has non-voting Clay County advisory panel seat; REPI-supported land conservation with NFLT; Wildlife Management Area agreement with FWC.	Clay County engagement is improving but non-voting status limits formal integration; Bradford County engagement is absent.	Clay County coordination relies on current personnel relationships and is not codified; Bradford County risk could grow if development pressure increases.	Formalizing Clay County partnership preserves continuity; a low-commitment MOU with Bradford County would address a gap proactively.
Wildfire	Informal coordination is in place with Florida Forest Service for wildland fire support, though not formalized.	Informal arrangement has not been significantly tested but appears to function effectively under current conditions.	Wildfire risk is growing for conservation lands and FPL substation; informal arrangement may prove insufficient over time.	Formalizing the existing relationship requires minimal new effort; primary work is documenting and clarifying existing roles.
Housing	No formal or informal coordination exists with Clay County or surrounding communities regarding housing availability or affordability.	Extended commute times and limited attainable housing indicate that current measures are not adequately addressing readiness impacts.	No coordinated housing strategy in place; disruptions and shortages may worsen over time, affecting personnel readiness.	Opportunities may exist to leverage Clay County and regional housing initiatives; Middleburg identified as a potential focus area.

3.2.4 MCSF Blount Island

3.2.4.1 Primary Vulnerabilities

- *Transportation Infrastructure:* Blount Island has limited entrance and egress redundancy because of installation geography. Roadways are vulnerable to SLR, congestion, and aging infrastructure. Railway infrastructure also lacks redundancy and faces flooding risk.
- *Utility Infrastructure:* Potable water systems lack redundancy. The JEA substation is vulnerable to storm surge and there is no backup.
- *Shoreline Vulnerability:* The installation is exposed to SLR, erosion, and storm surge.



- *Housing:* Housing struggles and school issues for families are present, along with hiring difficulties in Jacksonville.

3.2.4.2 Evaluation of Mutual Support Coverage

Transportation Infrastructure

Existence: The North Florida TPO convenes FDOT, Duval County, and other regional stakeholders to coordinate transportation planning. While the U.S. Navy holds an ex officio position on the TPO board, the review did not identify direct representation from Blount Island or any formal mechanism ensuring Marine Corps installation priorities are elevated within TPO planning. While some coordination with CSX exists for rail certification and inspection, no collaboration was identified with CSX regarding specific rail vulnerabilities affecting Blount Island.

Effectiveness: The Navy's participation on the TPO provides a meaningful avenue through which installation concerns can be expressed within regional transportation planning, and this involvement is helping to ensure that roadway and access priorities are considered in that process. However, the absence of any formal coordination with CSX represents a distinct and unaddressed gap.

Future Conditions: Blount Island's geography creates inherent access issues, with limited entry and exit points. SLR, congestion, and aging infrastructure are projected to intensify these vulnerabilities. CSX rail lacks redundancy and faces flooding risk. Without coordination explicitly addressing these constraints, it is uncertain whether planning processes will address these issues over time.

Efficiency: The Navy's existing presence on the TPO board provides an efficient and already-operational mechanism for increasing awareness of the installation's roadway and access priorities within regional transportation planning. Rail infrastructure, however, sits outside this framework entirely. CSX coordination would require a distinct effort. Pursuing that coordination jointly with Camp Blanding would be more efficient than separate, installation-level approaches and would strengthen the case for CSX engagement.

Utility Infrastructure

Existence: Utilities (water, sewer, and electrical primary lines) are JEA-owned and operated; the installation is responsible for secondary and branch lines. The review did not identify any IGSA or similar agreement addressing substation or potable water system vulnerabilities. Communication lines are owned by AT&T, and there have been internal MCSF Blount Island discussions on a project to bring a secondary communications feed onto the installation from Fernandina Beach.

Effectiveness: JEA handles primary utility service, which removes some operational burden from the installation. However, this structural arrangement limits the installation's formal authority over JEA's infrastructure resilience decisions affecting the installation.



Future Conditions: The current arrangement adequately covers routine operations and maintenance, with JEA handling O&M before the meter and the installation handling it after. The installation is served by a single JEA substation with no backup. Storm surge risk to that substation is projected to worsen. Potable water redundancy gaps could become mission-critical in a disaster scenario.

Efficiency: The installation's reliance on a single JEA substation means any disruption would affect the entire facility. Addressing that vulnerability would require coordination with JEA regardless. Therefore, formalizing that coordination through an IGSA or similar agreement may warrant the effort required.

Shoreline Vulnerability

Existence: Blount Island has engaged in project-specific shoreline planning and design work with the USACE and has received grant funding for a project titled, "Nature-based Solutions for Coastal Resilience: Overcoming Systemic Challenges" from the Environmental Security Technology Certification Program. Additional collaboration has occurred through the USACE Engineering With Nature program. More recently, the City of Jacksonville, UGA IRIS, and NFWF have been actively exploring thin layer placement and dredge material reuse at Blount Island, where dredging has been identified as an urgent need (NCCOS 2025). The City of Jacksonville has also previously undertaken shoreline protection efforts in partnership with the USACE.

Effectiveness: The active exploration of thin layer placement and dredge reuse at Blount Island, in combination with previous coastal resilience projects, suggests that the installation is actively engaged on shoreline issues. However, in the absence of recurring formal coordination, these efforts appear project-driven rather than programmatic.

Future Conditions: SLR, storm surge, and erosion are projected to worsen at Blount Island, and the operational urgency of dredging needs underscores that shoreline conditions already have near-term mission implications, not merely long-range ones. Without a dedicated coordination channel or mechanism, shoreline resilience efforts may be reactionary to funding opportunities rather than pursuant to planning.

Efficiency: As Blount Island and NS Mayport face similar shoreline vulnerabilities, and as project-based USACE partnerships already exist, a coordinated, multi-installation shoreline agreement may be an efficient alternative to pursuing isolated, project-specific efforts. The recently convened UGA Steering Committee, discussed in Section 3.2.1.2 for NS Mayport, may represent a low-effort opportunity to pursue sustained, programmatic coordination on shoreline vulnerabilities among regional stakeholders.

Housing

Existence: The review did not identify any current agreements or informal partnerships that address housing for installation personnel.

Effectiveness: Hiring difficulties and extended commute times cited by interviewees indicate the current approach is not adequately addressing housing-related impacts on the installation.



Future Conditions: Jacksonville’s housing market pressures are unlikely to decrease in the future. In the absence of coordination with the City or regional partners, housing pressures may continue to affect civilian staff stability and general commute burdens over time.

Efficiency: The installation communicates with the City of Jacksonville’s community planning office. Formalizing coordination with the City on housing would likely require modest effort and may help address an issue consistently raised across interviews.

Table 3-5 summarizes the installation-level assessment findings for MCSF Blount Island. Opportunities and recommendations that build off these findings are presented in Section 4.

Table 3-5. MCSF Blount Island Findings Summary

Vulnerability	Existence	Effectiveness	Future Conditions	Efficiency
Transportation Infrastructure	There is no direct Blount Island representation on the TPO, but the Navy holds an ex officio position. No CSX coordination on rail vulnerabilities.	Blount Island transportation vulnerabilities appear to be effectively elevated in regional discussion through the TPO.	Geographic access constraints, SLR, congestion, and aging infrastructure concerns are likely to intensify. CSX rail lacks redundancy and faces flooding risk.	CSX coordination could potentially be pursued in conjunction with Camp Blanding given similar rail dependencies.
Utility Infrastructure	There is no IGSA or similar agreement identified that addresses redundancy vulnerabilities to JEA utilities. Internal discussions on projects to bring in secondary communications feed are being held.	JEA O&M arrangement removes some operational burden from the installation, but resilience vulnerabilities are not addressed through formal coordination.	The single JEA substation has no backup; storm surge risk is projected to worsen. Potable water redundancy gaps could become mission-critical in a disaster scenario.	Addressing the single-substation vulnerability requires JEA coordination. Formalization through an MSA is warranted.



Table 3-5. MCSF Blount Island Findings Summary

Vulnerability	Existence	Effectiveness	Future Conditions	Efficiency
Shoreline Erosion	USACE collaboration and grant-funded living shoreline work is underway; City/UGA IRIS/NFWF is exploring thin layer placement and dredge reuse.	Project-driven work and partnerships are present, though recurring formal coordination is lacking.	SLR, storm surge, and erosion are projected to worsen. The operational urgency of dredging needs underscores near-term mission implications.	The newly convened UGA Steering Committee is a low-effort vehicle for sustained coordination.
Housing	There are no agreements or partnerships addressing housing availability or affordability for installation personnel.	Hiring difficulties and extended commute times indicate current approach is not meeting housing-related readiness needs.	Jacksonville housing pressures are unlikely to ease; continued inaction may affect civilian staff stability and commute burdens.	Formalizing coordination on housing would likely require modest effort and a regional approach.

3.3 Themes, Gaps, and Regional Opportunities

The installation-level analysis reveals a set of themes that characterize the mutual support landscape in the MIRR study area. These themes show both a strong foundation of effective coordination on specific issues, as well as certain mutual support gaps that leave installations and communities without formal support in areas of growing regional concern.

3.3.1.1 Strengths

The most consistent strength identified across all installations is the success of fire protection, emergency service, and law enforcement agreements. These agreements are in place at every installation in the study area, and interview participants consistently cited them as effective and essential. They represent the clearest example of mutual support in the region, with agreements that are formalized, regularly tested, and trusted by all parties.

Beyond emergency services, **Navy installations benefit from an encroachment protection framework.** The 2022 Encroachment Protection Agreement between the U.S. DoD, the City of Jacksonville, and NFLT has resulted in the acquisition of development rights on more than 1,700 acres of land within APZs around NAS Jacksonville and NS Mayport.

Additionally, at the regional coordination level, **there is a strong willingness between county and municipal governments to engage local military installations.** An interviewee noted



Jacksonville is one of only two cities nationwide with a cabinet-level military affairs coordination office (alongside New York), providing installations with a direct channel of communication to the mayor, school board, and other senior decision-makers.

3.3.1.2 Systemic Gaps

Transportation infrastructure resilience emerged as a universal concern across all four installations during the VA. Roadway vulnerabilities, including flood-prone access routes, single points of entry, and aging infrastructure were frequently cited. While no formal mutual support agreements address these concerns, much of the responsibility to do so lies outside of the jurisdiction of the installations. The North Florida TPO provides a formal forum where these issues can be raised, including through Navy representation for NAS Jacksonville and NS Mayport. However, no transportation-specific MSAs were identified that translate these planning discussions into formal commitments or sustained coordination for installation access resilience. Project-specific engagement with FDOT occurs in some cases, but it is unclear whether this is sufficient for the scale of vulnerability identified.

Utility infrastructure presents a similar gap. At NAS Jacksonville and NS Mayport, IGSAs with JEA cover routine O&M of primary utilities but do not address resilience planning or infrastructure redundancy. Both installations are served by a single electrical substation with no backup, and several substations are vulnerable to storm surge or flooding. At Camp Blanding, power is provided by FPL, and no IGSA or comparable resilience-focused agreement was identified. Utility vulnerabilities, including substation wildfire exposure and water or wastewater redundancy gaps, are not addressed through structured coordination. At Blount Island, JEA provides primary utilities, but no resilience-focused agreement was identified, and the installation likewise relies on a single substation with no backup. Across installations, while operational utility service is defined, coordination focused specifically on resilience and redundancy remains limited.

Shoreline vulnerability presents a similar pattern. Both Blount Island and NS Mayport have engaged in project-specific shoreline planning and design work in partnership with the USACE, and Duval County has likewise undertaken shoreline protection initiatives. These efforts demonstrate active collaboration; however, no ongoing mutual support agreement was identified that institutionalizes shoreline resilience coordination. As SLR and storm surge risks intensify, reliance on discrete project funding rather than sustained coordination may limit long-term resilience planning.

Wildfire risk, particularly at Camp Blanding, reflects a comparable dynamic. An informal working relationship exists with the Florida Forest Service for wildland fire support and is lauded. However, it has not been formalized. Further, no regional coalition exists to address shared fuels reduction needs as a means for mitigating wildfire intensities (Hoyles 2026). As wildfire exposure increases for conservation lands, as well as for electric and other infrastructure, the absence of such formal mutual support may heighten risks over time.

Housing affordability and availability was mentioned in conversations with all installations and government entities. Personnel at some installations commute more than 1 hour each way because of the lack of attainable housing closer to duty stations. Despite past efforts by the



NEFRC, including the convening of an affordable housing committee, and the publishing of an Affordable Housing Strategy in 2022, there is no currently active, coordinated regional effort to address workforce and personnel housing challenges for regional installations (NEFRC 2022).

State level policy also emerged as a threat to multiple facilities. Multiple interviewees identified the “Blue Ribbon Bill” (HB 299 and SB 354, 2026 session), which would have shifted local land use authority from local governments to the state, as a threat to installation mission assuredness. Both bills received multiple readings, but ultimately neither was taken to a vote. While the recent concern has subsided, it is possible the proposal could return in the next legislation session. The passage of this or similar legislation could undermine current encroachment protection efforts as local development control would be moved away from jurisdictions currently coordinating with regional installations.

Lastly, the informal nature of many of the region’s otherwise effective partnerships could pose a structural threat to existing coordination. Current informal partnerships frequently depend on specific individuals rather than formalized, institutionalized mechanisms. Several interviewees noted that working relationships are strong precisely because of who holds certain positions today; those relationships could deteriorate over time with staff turnover unless these partnerships are codified.



4 Recommendations

After conducting installation-specific analysis and identifying regional strengths and weaknesses in the current mutual support network, a set of opportunities and recommendations were identified where expanding collaboration and partnerships can better position the region to plan for, collaborate on, and respond to shared vulnerabilities. These recommendations are intentionally framed at the institutional level. Where specific physical vulnerabilities require targeted capital investment or infrastructure solutions, those project-level decisions will be addressed through subsequent tasks of the MIRR. The goal here is to ensure that the right partnerships, governance structures, and coordination mechanisms are in place so that when those decisions are made, there is an organizational foundation capable of acting on them.

4.1 Regional Recommendations

4.1.1 Recommendation R-1: Strengthen Formal Transportation Infrastructure Coordination

The North Florida TPO provides a durable institutional mechanism for regional transportation planning. The Navy's participation at the TPO in an ex officio capacity serves as an important mechanism to provide more visibility of installation transportation priorities. NAS Jacksonville and NS Mayport also benefit from meaningful informal engagement with FDOT on specific projects.

Rail infrastructure presents a distinct challenge. CSX owns and operates rail assets that are critical to both Camp Blanding and Blount Island. Because CSX is a private entity, the path to formal coordination is different than with public agencies. Nonetheless, the shared dependency across two installations suggests there may be efficiency in pursuing a coordinated engagement approach. CSX collaborates with Blount Island, as it does with other landowners, for joint rail inspections and certification. This informal relationship could potentially be leveraged into broader coordination with CSX on infrastructure vulnerabilities, maintenance planning, and service continuity. **Camp Blanding and Blount Island could jointly pursue a low commitment MOU or LOI to provide a foundation for collaboration with CSX on infrastructure resilience.**

4.1.2 Recommendation R-2: Strengthen and Expand Utility Infrastructure Coordination

Across the study area, utility infrastructure, particularly electrical supply, represents one of the most significant and least-addressed vulnerability areas in terms of mutual support. Navy installations served by JEA have IGSAs in place, but these agreements focus on routine O&M rather than resilience planning or redundancy. Camp Blanding has no comparable agreement with FPL. In both cases, installations are served by single substations with no backup power infrastructure and limited formal coordination with their utility providers on long-term resilience.



NS Mayport and Blount Island should pursue an expansion of their existing JEA IGSA to explicitly incorporate resilience and redundancy planning. At a minimum, an expanded agreement should establish a standing coordination mechanism for discussing substation vulnerabilities, long-term infrastructure hardening, and continuity of service during extreme weather events. Where resilience improvements require capital investment rather than operational coordination alone, the IGSA may not be the appropriate vehicle for committing those funds; in such cases, the expanded IGSA could reference the need for a capital investment strategy and designate it as governed by a separate process. For Camp Blanding and Blount Island, where no IGSA or comparable agreement with their respective utilities currently exists, establishing a baseline coordination framework should be treated as a near-term priority.

An additional and underused avenue for advancing utility resilience lies in Florida's regulatory framework. JEA and FPL are subject to oversight by the Florida Public Service Commission (FPSC), which has jurisdiction over the safety and reliability of JEA and FPL's electrical systems and requires the filing of periodic Storm Hardening Reports detailing efforts to strengthen the grid against natural hazards. These reports represent a formal, legally binding process through which infrastructure hardening priorities are established and documented. To the extent that the substations serving regional installations are not currently reflected in those priorities, the installations have a concrete interest in ensuring their specific vulnerabilities are communicated to and incorporated into the utility's FPSC reporting cycle.

4.1.3 Recommendation R-3: Formalize and Institutionalize Shoreline Resilience Coordination

NS Mayport and Blount Island both face significant shoreline erosion vulnerabilities tied to SLR, storm surge, and ongoing coastal processes. Importantly, a meaningful coordination foundation already exists: the City of Jacksonville, UGA IRIS, and NFWF are currently implementing shoreline projects in the area; Blount Island has pursued coastal resilience and beneficial re-use of dredged material projects with USACE; and the Navy and UGA IRIS have a resilience-focused IGSA in place.

While this level of engagement on shoreline efforts is promising, ensuring that installation shoreline vulnerabilities are addressed through sustained, prioritized regional planning rather than ad hoc, grant-driven project timelines is crucial to building long-term resilience. **A formalized coordination arrangement among key stakeholders including NS Mayport, Blount Island, the City of Jacksonville, and USACE focused on shoreline resilience would provide a durable platform for joint planning, shared data, and coordinated advocacy for resources and project prioritization.**⁷

⁷ At the time of this writing, Navy representatives have relayed that UGA IRIS, through their existing partnership with the Navy, have convened the inaugural meeting of a multi-stakeholder Steering Committee that brings together the Navy, the City of Jacksonville, the St. Johns River Water Management District, and the USACE. The Steering Committee was convened to bring synergy to the multiple coastal resilience projects occurring in the region. The committee has the potential to be an excellent vehicle to fulfill the shoreline coordination recommendation and to provide a meaningful platform for regional stakeholders to engage on coastal resilience and shoreline protection.



4.1.4 Recommendation R-4: Establish Regional Wildfire Fuels Management Coordination

No coordinated wildfire fuels management effort exists in the Northeast Florida region. While informal relationships support wildfire response, and project-specific fuels treatments occur, there is no regional framework to coordinate across jurisdictions. **A regional fuels management mutual support partnership consisting of installations, state agencies, local governments, and large landowners could focus on identifying interjurisdictional treatment opportunities, prioritizing areas of shared risk, and aligning existing programs and resources to support more consistent implementation over time (Hoyles 2026).**

Other regions of Florida have demonstrated the value of this approach. Of note, the Gulf Coastal Plain Ecosystem Partnership represents more than a dozen large landowners that coordinate around prescribed fire treatments and other ground management techniques to reduce biofuels contributing to wildfire intensity (Hoyles 2026). A regional approach of this nature to address fuels management in the context of Northeast Florida's vulnerabilities would move the region beyond project-specific efforts and toward more consistent, cross-boundary coordination.

4.1.5 Recommendation R-5: Reestablish a Regional Housing Coordination Effort

Housing affordability and availability was identified as a personnel stressor across all installations in the study area. Personnel commuting 1 hour or more each way because of the unavailability of attainable housing near duty stations represents not just a quality-of-life issue but a mission readiness concern, particularly when transportation disruptions compound the problem. Despite this, there is currently no coordinated regional effort to address military and civilian workforce housing.

NEFRC previously convened an affordable housing committee and published a regional Affordable Housing Strategy in 2022, demonstrating both the appetite for and feasibility of regional coordination on this issue (NEFRC 2022). The recommendation here is to **revive and expand that coordination effort with explicit inclusion of military installation housing needs as a core focus area**. This could take the form of a reconvened regional housing working group that includes installation representatives, local housing authorities, county and municipal planning offices, community development organizations, and other regional groups involved in the housing sector including the Northeast Florida Builders Association (for developer perspective and engagement) and higher education entities (such as the University of North Florida and the UF Health Science Center, who may be dealing with student housing issues). Jacksonville's Office of Military Affairs is a natural convening partner given its direct lines of communication to both the mayor's office and the installations.



4.2 Installation-Specific Recommendations

4.2.1 Recommendation I-1: Formalize an MAA between Camp Blanding and the Florida Forest Service for Wildland Fire Support

An informal working relationship exists between Camp Blanding and the Florida Forest Service for wildland fire coordination. This relationship is valued by both parties, but it is unwritten and therefore vulnerable to deterioration through leadership transitions. **Formalizing this arrangement into a written MOA or MAA is a low-cost action that would preserve a coordination mechanism that is genuinely needed.** Camp Blanding's conservation lands and FPL substation are both identified as wildfire vulnerabilities, and the Florida Forest Service is the most natural and capable partner for addressing them.

Wildfire risk at Camp Blanding is identified as an increasing concern. An informal working relationship with the Florida Forest Service for wildland fire support exists and was described positively, but there is no identified formal agreement establishing durable roles, expectations, or continuity for this support. As wildfire exposure increases over time, reliance on an unwritten arrangement may create avoidable continuity risk under leadership turnover or shifting priorities. Formalizing the existing working relationship through an MAA would institutionalize the current coordination and clarify responsibilities for wildfire support when needed.

4.2.2 Recommendation I-2: Establish a Formal Planning and Zoning Coordination Agreement with Bradford County

Camp Blanding's western boundary borders Bradford County, yet no formal coordination mechanism exists for planning and zoning issues. Unlike Clay County, where an unofficial but functional advisory relationship has developed, Bradford County has not been engaged on encroachment-related planning issues despite the installation's interest in doing so. Development pressure in Bradford County is currently lower than in Clay County, but that dynamic could shift, and the absence of any coordination framework means the installation has no structured means of elevating concerns before development decisions are made.

Camp Blanding should pursue a low-commitment planning coordination relationship with Bradford County. Establishing a standing mechanism for the installation to provide input on planning and zoning decisions within a defined buffer zone would ensure that Bradford County growth patterns do not create encroachment risks before they become difficult to address.

4.2.3 Recommendation I-3: Formalize the Existing Camp Blanding-Clay County Land Use and Encroachment Coordination Relationship

Camp Blanding's relationship with Clay County on encroachment and land use issues has been effective to date. The installation holds a non-voting seat on Clay County's planning advisory



panel, participates in the land conservation committee, and is in the process of developing a new land purchasing agreement. However, it remains largely uncodified and dependent on personal relationships. **This relationship should be formalized through a written MOA or interlocal agreement that codifies the installation's role in the Clay County planning and advisory process, establishes a standing coordination mechanism for land use and encroachment issues, and ensures continuity independent of individual personnel.** Given the existing strength of the relationship, the primary work here is documentation and clarification of roles rather than building something new, making this a low-effort, high-value action.

4.2.4 Recommendation I-4: Confirm Renewal Status and Reexecute the NS Mayport–Jacksonville Port Docking Agreement

NS Mayport maintains an operational agreement with the Jacksonville Port Authority (JAXPORT) that allows Navy vessels to tie up at the civilian port during storms and periods of sustained high winds. This agreement provides a critical resilience capability: when wind conditions exceed the threshold for bridge closure, Mayport effectively becomes an island, and the ability to relocate vessels to an alternative berth is an important operational contingency. The agreement has been exercised and represents a practical, mission-relevant form of mutual support between the installation and a neighboring civilian maritime facility.

The review identified uncertainty around the current status of this agreement. Interview notes indicate that the agreement may have been approaching expiration in 2025, and it was unclear whether renewal discussions had been initiated. Given the operational value of this arrangement and the relatively low burden of reexecution, allowing it to lapse without action would represent an avoidable mission continuity risk. **NS Mayport should confirm the current status of the JAXPORT docking agreement and, if it has lapsed, prioritize its renewal.**

4.3 Implementation Guidance: Best Practices for Mutual Support Agreements

The Northeast Florida region enters this next phase of MSA development from a position of strength. Emergency services and law enforcement frameworks are well-established, and other formal and informal partnerships reflect strong relationships and a culture of mutual reliance between installations and their neighboring communities. The task ahead is not to build from scratch, but to convert existing trust and informal practice into durable, resilient agreements.

Drawing on lessons learned from comparable MIRRs, the following best practices are offered to guide the development and implementation of new and expanded MSAs in the region.

Leverage Existing Success. Effective MSAs have already been enacted in the region to protect the shared goals of installations and their adjacent communities. This is evident through the wide network of emergency services agreements as well as through encroachment protection efforts in the Jacksonville area. These successes should inform new agreements. Parties seeking to develop MSAs for utility resilience, transportation, or housing coordination can draw directly on the governance structures, funding mechanisms, and relationship-building approaches that made these programs effective.



Start with Quick Wins. Some of the most impactful MSAs are also among the simplest. Not every agreement needs to tackle a large, complex regional challenge from the outset. Starting with narrower, well-defined arrangements can get parties to the table, demonstrate tangible value, and build the momentum needed to pursue more ambitious collaboration over time.

In the Northeast Florida context, some quick wins are within reach; Camp Blanding's wildland fire support relationship with the Florida Forest Service is informally functioning and stakeholders have already flagged it as a priority for formalization; confirming the renewal status of the NS Mayport-JAXPORT docking agreement is a straightforward path to ensuring the continuity of an existing and effective relationship; and formalizing Camp Blanding's relationship with Clay County on encroachment would codify a partnership that is already in place.⁸

Foster Stakeholder Buy-In. The success of any MSA depends on the degree to which all parties feel ownership over it. Early and genuine engagement with installation commanders, local elected officials, planning directors, utility providers, and other key stakeholders helps ensure that the agreement reflects real operational needs rather than abstract administrative requirements. It also conveys concerns early, before they become obstacles to implementation.

Importantly, much of this groundwork has already been done across the Northeast Florida region. The informal partnerships and working relationships identified through this study reflect existing buy-in. This is a meaningful advantage, as parties are not being asked to begin collaborating, but to formalize collaboration they have already chosen to undertake.

Sustain Efforts Over the Long Term. One of the most consistent findings is that effective coordination in the region is relationship dependent. Multiple interviewees noted that current partnerships function well because of the specific individuals involved, but acknowledged that staff turnover, command rotations, or changes in local administration could disrupt those connections. This is precisely the vulnerability that well-designed MSAs are intended to address. By putting coordination structures in writing, with clear roles, responsibilities, and points of contact, installations and their community partners can ensure that the effectiveness of their partnerships does not hinge on any single person remaining in their role.

Designate Stakeholder Champions. For an MSA to move from concept to execution and to remain active and effective over time, it needs identifiable champions within each partner organization. Champions are senior leaders or designated staff who understand the agreement's purpose, can navigate their own organization's bureaucratic requirements, and are empowered to drive progress when momentum stalls. By designating champions from each partnership organization, an MSA establishes accountability and ensures that there is a dedicated individual who can support the goals of the agreement moving forward.

Establish Legal Concurrence Early. Establishing legal concurrence early in the development of any new MSA ensures that the terms of the agreement are clear, actionable, and understood by all parties, not just those who signed it. It also identifies potential conflicts with existing contracts, jurisdictional boundaries, or statutory requirements before they become problems. Given

⁸ See section 4.2 above for more details on these opportunities.



the multi-jurisdictional complexity of the Northeast Florida region, early legal engagement is especially important for ensuring that agreements are both legally sound and operationally viable to the staff who will carry them out.

Let Data Drive Decisions and Improvements. Effective MSAs are not static documents. They should include mechanisms for regular review, performance tracking, and course correction as conditions change. Establishing clear metrics and review cycles at the outset of an agreement provides a framework for continuous improvement without requiring parties to renegotiate from scratch each time circumstances shift.

Assess Impacts Continuously. When developing an MSA, it is important to assess both the direct and indirect impacts of the agreement to fully understand its implications. Direct impacts refer to the immediate outcomes of mutual support or shared services, such as improved emergency response times or reduced infrastructure downtime. Indirect effects might include an MSA's impact on existing vendor contracts, unintended delays, workforce capacity, or adjacent service areas. A thorough assessment of direct and indirect impacts can ensure all parties are prepared for both the anticipated benefits and any potential unintended consequences.



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Appendix A. Existing Mutual Support Agreements and Supportive Partnerships



Table A-1. Existing Mutual Support Agreements and Supportive Partnerships

Installation/ Federal Govt Entity	State Govt Entity	County/ Regional Govt Entities	Local Govt Entities	Other Entities	Agreement Type	Focal Area	Date
Blount Island	N/A	N/A	N/A	University of North Florida	Memorandum of Understanding	Education	2023 – 2026
Camp Blanding	State of Florida	N/A	N/A	N/A	Informal Agreement	Fire protection, emergency mgmt., hazmat, post-disaster response, and/or Emergency Operations Center (EOC)	N/A
N/A	N/A	Clay County	City of Jacksonville	N/A	Interlocal Agreement	Fire protection, emergency mgmt., hazmat, post-disaster response, and/or EOC	2013 – ongoing
Naval Station (NS) Mayport	N/A	N/A	City of Jacksonville	N/A	Interlocal Agreement	Fire protection, emergency mgmt., hazmat, post-disaster response, and/or EOC	1994/2012 – ongoing
NS Mayport	N/A	N/A	JAXPORT	N/A	Memorandum of Agreement	Fire protection, emergency mgmt., hazmat, post-disaster response, and/or EOC	2020 – 2025
Blount Island	N/A	N/A	Jacksonville Fire and Rescue Department	N/A	Memorandum of Understanding	Fire protection, emergency mgmt., hazmat, post-disaster response, and/or EOC	2019 – ongoing
Blount Island and Navy Medicine Readiness and Training Command Jacksonville	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Memorandum of Understanding	Fire protection, emergency mgmt., hazmat, post-disaster response, and/or EOC	2020 – 2025
Blount Island and C. L. Burpee Army Reserve Center	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Memorandum of Understanding	Fire protection, emergency mgmt., hazmat, post-disaster response, and/or EOC	N/A
Naval Air Station (NAS) Jacksonville	N/A	Clay County	N/A	N/A	Mutual Aid Agreement	Fire protection, emergency mgmt., hazmat, post-disaster response, and/or EOC	2022 – 2032
NAS Jacksonville	N/A	N/A	City of Jacksonville	N/A	Mutual Aid Agreement	Fire protection, emergency mgmt., hazmat, post-disaster response, and/or EOC	2012 – ongoing
NAS Jacksonville	N/A	N/A	Town of Orange Park	N/A	Mutual Aid Agreement	Fire protection, emergency mgmt., hazmat, post-disaster response, and/or EOC	N/A



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Installation/ Federal Govt Entity	State Govt Entity	County/ Regional Govt Entities	Local Govt Entities	Other Entities	Agreement Type	Focal Area	Date
N/A	N/A	N/A	City of Jacksonville, Town of Orange Park	N/A	Mutual Aid Agreement	Fire protection, emergency mgmt., hazmat, post-disaster response, and/or EOC	2017 – ongoing
Camp Blanding	N/A	Clay County	N/A	N/A	Mutual Aid Agreement	Fire protection, emergency mgmt., hazmat, post-disaster response, and/or EOC	1998 – ongoing
Camp Blanding	N/A	Clay County	N/A	N/A	Memorandum of Agreement	Land for public safety training purposes	2021 – ongoing
U.S. Department of Defense	N/A	N/A	City of Jacksonville	North Florida Land Trust	Encroachment Protection Agreement	Land use and encroachment	2022 – ongoing
U.S. Navy	N/A	N/A	City of Jacksonville		Lease	Land use and encroachment	2022 – 2047
U.S. Navy	N/A	N/A	City of Jacksonville	N/A	Lease	Land use and encroachment	2023 – 2048
NAS Jax, NS Mayport, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS)	N/A	N/A	City of Jacksonville	N/A	Memorandum of Agreement	Law enforcement/security	N/A
NS Mayport	N/A	N/A	City of Jacksonville	N/A	Memorandum of Agreement	Law enforcement/security	2016 – ongoing
Blount Island	N/A	N/A	Jacksonville Sheriff's Office	N/A	Memorandum of Understanding	Law enforcement/security	N/A
Blount Island and U.S. Coast Guard Sector Jacksonville	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Memorandum of Understanding	Law enforcement/security	N/A
Blount Island	Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles	N/A	N/A	N/A	Memorandum of Understanding	Law enforcement/security	2022 – 2028
Blount Island	N/A	N/A	City of Tallahassee	N/A	Memorandum of Understanding	Law enforcement/security	2018 – ongoing
Blount Island	Florida Department of Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission	N/A	N/A	N/A	Memorandum of Understanding	Law enforcement/security	2019– ongoing
NS Mayport	N/A	N/A	Jacksonville Sheriff's Office	N/A	Operating Agreement	Law enforcement/security	2023 – 2032
N/A	N/A	Clay County	City of Green Cove Springs, Town of Orange Park	N/A	Mutual Aid Agreement	Law enforcement/security	2025 – ongoing



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Installation/ Federal Govt Entity	State Govt Entity	County/ Regional Govt Entities	Local Govt Entities	Other Entities	Agreement Type	Focal Area	Date
Navy Region Southeast	N/A	N/A	N/A	University of Georgia’s Institute for Resilient Infrastructure Systems	Intergovernmental Service Agreement (IGSA)	Resilience & environmental protection	2024 – 2034
N/A	Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT)	N/A	City of Jacksonville	N/A	Interlocal Agreement	Resilience & environmental protection	2020 – 2026
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers	N/A	N/A	City of Jacksonville	N/A	Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)	Resilience & environmental protection	2016 – ongoing
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers	N/A	N/A	City of Jacksonville	N/A	Project Cooperation Agreement	Resilience & environmental protection	1994
Federal Emergency Management Agency	Florida Department of Environmental Protection	Resilient First Coast - regional resiliency collaborative for Northeast Florida, which includes Baker, Clay, Duval, Flagler, Nassau, Putnam, and St. Johns counties.	Local governments within member counties	Businesses, non-profit organizations, academia	Regional resilience collaborative	Resilience & environmental protection	N/A
NS Mayport	N/A	N/A	N/A	JEA	Intergovernmental Service Agreement (IGSA)	Utility operations and maintenance	2024 – ongoing
NAS Jacksonville	N/A	N/A	N/A	JEA	Intergovernmental Service Agreement (IGSA)	Utility operations and maintenance	2024 – ongoing
Camp Blanding	Florida Forest Service	N/A	N/A	N/A	Informal Agreement	Wildland Fire Support	N/A

N/A = Not Applicable

